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Some Horwitzian Themes 
in the Law and History 
of the Federal Courts 
EDWARD A. PURCELL JR. 
ALTHOUGH NEITHER VOLUME OF MORTON HORWITZ'S PATHBREAKING 
Work The Transformation of American Law focuses on issues of federal jurisdic-
tion and procedure, many of its themes resonate richly in those areas. Indeed, 
some of its insights and conclusions apply as forcefully to those fields as they do 
to the areas that Transformation examined in detail. 1 In the law and history of the 
federal courts, three Horwitzian themes loom as particularly significant. 
THREE RESONANT THEMES FROM TRANSFORMATION 
First, Morty probed beyond those who have emphasized the Jacksonian roots, 
laissez-faire economic assumptions, or allegedly pro-corporate biases of the late 
nineteenth-century Supreme Court to highlight the marked differences that 
existed between what he called its "old" and "new" conservatives. The old conser-
vatives, Morty told us, were "suspicious of corporate power," experienced 
"anguish" when they considered the nation's growing industrial concentration, 
and held views that were "rooted in an increasingly nostalgic vision of the natural-
ness and necessity of a decentralized, competitive market system."2 In contrast, 
One of the highest tributes I could pay Mort Horwitz is to admit the perplexing difficulty-
shared, I suspect, by many who contributed to this volume-of selecting a specific topic to 
discuss. It was a confounding challenge to try to pick out from the sweeping, provocative, 
and brilliant body of Morty's scholarship some particular aspect that might be fairly and 
reasonably discussed in brief compass. For their invaluable assistance in preparing this 
essay, I wish to thank two New York Law School students, Jared Kagan and Sara J. Mirsky. 
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the new conservatives "came to understand the corporation as a normal and nat-
ural mode of doing business" and "proclaimed the inevitability and efficiency of 
large organizations that derived from economies of scale."3 Morty found the gulf 
between the two groups apparent, for example, in their contrasting attitudes 
toward corporate law and anti-monopoly legislation,4 and he saw the balance on 
the Court between the two positions shifting from old to new during the 1890s, a 
decade torn by widespread social strife and a severe economic depression that 
generated a "widespread" feeling among Americans "that the country was falling 
apart."5 
The law and history of the federal courts confirm both the difference that 
Morty identified between an old and new conservatism on the Court and the piv-
otal role that the crisis of the 1890s played in shifting the Court from the former 
to the latter. In jurisdictional matters, for example, the Court in the 1870s was 
clearly suspicious of large national corporations and quite sympathetic to the 
ordinary individuals who sought to sue them. During that decade it reshaped 
jurisdictional rules to allow federal courts to hear suits against foreign corpora-
tions in forums outside their chartering states, and its decisions were designed to 
ensure that such corporations could be held accountable for the wrongs they 
committed.6 Rejecting the antebellum principle that a corporation was "present" 
and could be "found"-and hence sued-only in the state that granted its char-
ter,7 the Court held in Railroad Co. v. Harris in 1870 that foreign corporations 
were "present" and could be "found" and sued in any federal court in any state 
where they were actively doing business or had consented to suit as a condition 
of doing local business. While the defendant railroad sought to avoid jurisdiction 
by contending strenuously for the antebellum principle, the Court reasoned that 
in a nationalizing corporate economy the consequences of maintaining the old 
rule would be unfair and abusive. Under the antebellum principle, it explained, 
"however large or small the cause of action, and whether it was a proper one for 
legal or equitable cognizance, there could be no legal redress short of the seat of 
the company in another state. In many instances the cost of the remedy would 
have largely exceeded the value of its fruits. In suits local in their character, both 
at law and in equity, there could be no relief. The result would be, to a large 
extent, immunity from all legal responsibility."8 Thus, in Harris the Court altered 
the law to allow those with claims against foreign corporations to seek their 
redress in convenient and accessible local federal courts, thereby relieving them 
of the heavy practical burdens they would face if required to bring their suits in 
distant chartering states. Harris was, in Morty's terms, a classic old conservative 
decision. 
By the 1890s, however, much had changed. No longer was the choice between 
local and distant forums a critical issue in suits pitting individual claimants 
against national corporations. Rather, the newly pivotal issue in such suits was the 
choice between state and federal courts sitting in the same state. For a variety of 
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legal and practical reasons the federal courts had become particularly advanta-
geous forums for national corporations, and consequently individual plaintiffs 
sought assiduously, even desperately, to avoid them and maintain their actions in 
state courts. To assist them, states enacted a variety of laws designed to prevent 
foreign corporations from removing suits to federal court.9 One such tactic was to 
"adopt" out-of-state corporations, especially railroads acquiring in-state roadways, 
as local corporations. Such adoptions were intended to deprive foreign corpora-
tions of diverse citizenship with the enacting state's citizens and thereby prevent 
them from removing state court suits brought against them by those citizens. By 
the 1890s, however, the Court had also changed, and its earlier solicitude for ordi-
nary individuals who sued foreign corporations had disappeared. In 1896 a new 
conservative Court held in St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. v. James that, 
for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, corporations were citizens only of 
their chartering state and other states could not make them local "citizens."10 The 
decision meant that corporations would remain jurisdictionally diverse from the 
human citizens of every state but one. Consequently, national corporations would 
enjoy the widest possible access to the federal courts and be able to exploit system-
atically the compelling advantages they enjoyed in federal forums across the 
nation. Not surprisingly, the Court's opinion showed concern for neither 
the severe practical burdens that removal loaded on individual plaintiffs nor the 
Powerful pressures it placed on them to settle their claims cheaply or abandon 
them altogether. Its reasoning, moreover, was arbitrary, unconvincing, and devoid 
of social or economic analysis. 11 
The gulf between Harris and James exemplified a fundamental shift in the 
Court's social attitudes that was equally apparent in other jurisdictional areas. 
Before 1892, and especially after passage of the restrictive Judiciary Act of 
1887-88, the Court construed diversity jurisdiction narrowly and tightened its 
requirements in a variety of ways. 12 Then, the restrictive consequences of both the 
statute and the Court's decisions aided those who sued corporate defendants by 
making it easier for them to bring and hold their actions in the state courts. In the 
early 1890s, however, with no change in the controlling jurisdictional statutes, 
the Court suddenly reversed course. Across a range of issues, it began consistently 
to broaden the scope of diversity jurisdiction, allowing corporate defendants ever-
greater opportunities to remove actions to the federal courts.13 Indeed, the Court 
also reshaped federal question jurisdiction to achieve the same results. In 1892 it 
carved out a special rule that allowed federally appointed receivers, in the absence 
of diversity, to remove common-law tort suits against the corporations they rep-
resented on the dubious ground that the receiver's federal appointment created a 
federal question sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the national courts.14 In the 
social and political context of the 1890s, the abrupt alterations that the Court 
~ade in a wide variety of jurisdictional doctrines and the consistent social results 
it thereby achieved supported only one conclusion. The justices were purposely 
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remolding the rules of federal jurisdiction to protect corporate defendants against 
personal injury actions. 
The Court's shift from an old to a new conservatism was equally apparent in 
its development of the "general" federal common law under Swift v. Tyson. 15 
Between the 1870s and the 1890s, strict limits on the ability of common carriers 
to contract out of liability for personal injuries gave way to new rules that facili-
tated such liability-avoiding agreements; rules favoring insurance claimants in 
suits against insurers withered and were replaced by exacting rules that favored 
the companies; and overt hostility to the unforgiving fellow-servant rule transmo-
grified into profound admiration.16 In 1873, for example, the old conservative 
Court viewed the fellow-servant rule with deep skepticism, terming it "more tech-
nical than just" in one decision and "unsupported by reason" in another.17 1\venty 
years later, however, a new conservative Court enthusiastically embraced the 
rule and gave it a sweeping formulation. "Prima fade," the Court declared in 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad v. Baugh in 1893, "all who enter into the employ of 
a single master are engaged in a common service, and are fellow-servants."18 In a 
dozen years after the early 1890s, the Court issued a stunning range of common-
law decisions that protected corporate enterprise, fostered the new national 
economy, and imposed the growing risks of industrialism on the weakest and most 
vulnerable members of society. 
Thus, the transition from an old to a new conservatism that Morty identified 
in such areas as corporate, antitrust, and constitutional law occurred equally in 
the Court's jurisdictional decisions and common-law rulings. The most decisive 
changes, moreover, occurred at the time he specified, the 1890s, and as a result of 
essentially the same forces he suggested-market nationalization, industrial con-
flict, the rise of a militant populism, the most severe depression in the nation's 
history, and the resulting anxieties generated within the legal profession's 
unnerved elite.19 
A second point Morty made about the difference between old and new conser-
vatives may be even more important and perhaps less widely appreciated. During 
the 1870s and 1880s, he wrote, "the real source of division in the Supreme Court" 
was the "different views of the dangers of federal power and of governmental 
centralization."20 Morty illustrated his point by comparing the views of Justice 
Samuel Miller with those of Justice Stephen J. Field. In 1874 Miller was willing to 
hold in Loan Association v. Topeka that a state constitution contained an "implied 
limitation" on the power of municipalities to issue bonds. The danger of "class" 
legislation, Miller reasoned, required that such bonds be issued only for a valid 
"public purpose," a purpose that did not include subsidizing "private" economic 
enterprise.21 While Miller was thus willing to construe a state constitution innov-
atively and expansively, he was unwilling to do the same with the federal 
Constitution. In a case decided only three years after Loan Association, Miller 
refused to incorporate into the Fourteenth Amendment the same idea of implied 
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constitutional limitations on the taxing power.22 His refusal, Morty argued, was 
rooted in his "respect for the federal system" and his unwillingness to expand the 
reach of national power.23 Field, in contrast, had no such qualms. Rather, he 
sought early and avidly "to force just such an expansive view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on the Supreme Court."24 In opinions written on circuit in the early 
1880s, Field used the federal Constitution to limit the power of states to tax, and 
in a variety of other areas he pressed consistently for an expansive interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. By the 1890s, Morty argued, Field's broad 
interpretation-and the idea of implied federal constitutional limitations on leg-
islative power-had become a "deeply ingrained part of American constitutional 
doctrine."25 
Morty's point is critical, and it resonates broadly in the law and history of the 
federal courts. Beginning in the 1890s the United States Supreme Court began to 
turn away from values rooted in earlier concepts of federalism-except, of course, 
in racial matters-and to embrace values responsive to the new nationalizing and 
centralizing corporate economy. As it did so, it became a powerful force for a par-
allel and adaptive centralization in American law and government. It was thus 
judicial "conservatives"-in the circumstances, quite aptly termed "new"-who 
took the lead in forging a more highly unified national market, a more far-
reaching national law, and a more muscular and activist federal judiciary.26 
Much of this story is familiar, especially its central constitutional elements. The 
~ise of what came to be called substantive due process and liberty of contract-those 
Invigorating doctrines of national judicial power-even led some historians to label 
the whole period from 1890 to 1937 the Lochner era.27 Morty, of course, discussed 
many of these constitutional developments and suggested that the Court's liberty of 
contract decision in Lochner was a catalyst for the development of "Progressive 
Legal Thought."28 
The law and history of the federal courts show that the centralizing thrust of 
the new conservatives extended well beyond Lochner and its famous constitu-
tional companions. To enforce its new constitutional doctrines and principles, the 
Court reoriented the work of the lower federal courts, reshaped jurisdictional law 
across the board, and expanded both the reach and power of the federal judiciary. 
Indeed, over the course of little more than a quarter of a century from 1890 to 
World War I, it essentially created the powerful and commanding federal judicial 
system of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.29 
The new conservative Court acted boldly and broadly. It abandoned the 
assumption that the federal judiciary existed primarily to protect non-residents 
from bias or prejudice and accepted, instead, the view that its primary role was to 
enforce federal law and federal rights regardless of citizenship.30 It abandoned the 
View that adjudicating private law actions under diversity jurisdiction was central 
to the federal judiciary's role and embraced, instead, the view that adjudicating 
federal law claims under federal question jurisdiction was paramount.31 It sharply 
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narrowed the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, which limited federal judicial 
power, while steadily expanding the scope of federal equity jurisdiction to conduct 
corporate receiverships, check state regulatory activities, and enjoin strikes and 
other efforts to organize labor. It broadened the scope of the independent federal 
common law, undermined the idea that state courts were coequal expositors of 
federal law, and advanced the proposition that the federal courts were the 
"primary" defenders of federal rights. It blocked a variety of state efforts to limit 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, created new procedural doctrines to ensure 
that those who opposed state regulatory efforts would be able to challenge them 
in federal court, and inscribed in a variety of doctrinal areas the fundamental 
premise that federal jurisdiction existed to check and, if necessary, trump the 
jurisdiction of state courts.32 
The Court's treatment of its own appellate jurisdiction exemplified its central-
izing shift. In the early twentieth century the Court gradually broadened the 
category of state court judgments that it would review as "final," expanding 
the scope of the "record" it would consider in determining finality33 and accepting 
jurisdiction even when further proceedings or collateral actions were continu-
ing.34 Furthermore, it announced the constitutional principle that state courts 
were required to provide meaningful remedies in cases involving actions by state 
officials that violated the federal Constitution and that, if the state judiciaries 
failed to do so, the Court would review and reverse their judgments.:15 Similarly, it 
began to impose clearer due process limits on the ability of state courts to deny 
federal claims on state procedural grounds36 and seemed to tighten the standards 
it would apply in evaluating the "adequacy" of state court judgments that had the 
effect of foreclosing consideration of federal rights.37 An "untenable construction" 
of state law could not be allowed to defeat a federal right, the Court insisted in 
1904. "To hold otherwise would open an easy method of avoiding the jurisdiction 
of this court."38 
Perhaps most striking and innovative was the Court's sudden announcement 
that its jurisdiction to review state court judgments included the power to exam-
ine not just the law but the facts as well. What had previously been an "inflexible 
rule" that the Court would not reexamine a state court's findings of fact39 was 
transformed into a rebuttable presumption with two highly serviceable exceptions. 
In a series of four cases handed down in 1912 the Court advanced, implemented, 
and then codified "two propositions" that were, it claimed in the last of the four, 
"well settled."40 If a state court denied a federal right, the Court could reexamine 
the facts either when a party claimed that "there was no evidence whatever to 
support" the denial or when a state court's findings were "so intermingled" with 
its conclusions of law that it was "essentially necessary" to reexamine the former 
in order to review the latter.41 The decisions provided a substantial new tool for the 
cause of judicial centralization and federal supremacy, a typical product of Morty's 
activist and nationally oriented new conservatives.42 
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A third point that Morty stressed, one that runs through much of his work, 
is the importance and pervasiveness of the public-private distinction. He argued 
that the distinction, rooted in antebellum state constitutional law, was intended 
to wall off a "non-coercive" area of individual freedom and self-regulating market 
relations from the area where "coercive" state regulatory powers properly oper-
ated. The distinction became "more formal and systematic" during the 1870s and 
spread from eminent domain and the taxing power into a wide range of other 
legal fields, including torts, contract, property, and commercial law.43 
Confirming Morty's emphasis on its pervasive spread, the public-private dis-
tinction also became critical in the law of the federal courts. Repeatedly, the Court 
used it to remold and expand the scope of federal judicial power. Four milestones, 
all imposing tighter judicial limitations on legislative power, demonstrated its 
Pervasive use. 
First, and most obvious, the distinction underwrote the Court's elaboration of 
a "state action" requirement in the Fourteenth Amendment. Dealing primarily 
With a series of potentially explosive race cases in the 1870s and early 1880s, the 
Court limited the amendment's reach to formal governmental actions and 
excluded from its purview all forms of "private" behavior.44 In its state action 
guise, the public-private distinction perfectly suited the Court's policy goals at the 
time. Limiting the reach of the potentially revolutionary new amendment served 
both the federalism interests of the Court's old conservatives and the racial 
interests of the whites who were contemporaneously forging the terms of the 
Post-Reconstruction settlement. 
Revealingly, too, when the Court first used the public-private distinction to 
restrict the Fourteenth Amendment, it viewed the new provision as a source not 
of judicial authority but of legislative power only. The amendment, it explained in 
1880, at the exact time it was establishing the state action requirement, author-
ized Congress alone to safeguard the rights that the new provision established. "It 
is not said the judicial power of the general government shall extend to enforcing 
the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed" by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court declared in Ex parte Virginia. "It is not said 
that [the judicial] branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void 
any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions."45 Thus, when the Court orig-
inally incorporated the public-private distinction into its Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, it conceived the limitation as directed specifically at the legislative, 
not the judicial, power.46 
Next, the distinction appeared in the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment. In a series of cases culminating with Hans v. Louisiana in 1890, the 
Court held that the amendment recognized a comprehensive principle of state 
sovereign immunity that barred the federal courts from hearing suits against 
states regardless of whether they were brought by citizens or non-citizens. 47 While 
Hans successfully blocked a variety of troublesome suits designed to collect on 
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repudiated southern state bonds, it also created a striking new constitutional 
problem. If the Eleventh Amendment barred suits against states in federal courts, 
how could parties who sought to challenge state regulatory actions bring their 
suits in those courts? Over the years the Court had experimented with a variety of 
concepts and distinctions to answer that question48 before finally and cleanly 
resolving it by shaping another version of the public-private distinction. In 1908 
it ruled in Ex parte Young that, when a state agent attempted to enforce an uncon-
stitutional law, he was "stripped of his official or representative character" and 
subjected "in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct."49 Thus, 
the official stood before the courts not as a "public" person but as a "private" per-
son. Because the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits against private persons, 
the federal courts were consequently free to assert jurisdiction over them and 
enjoin their actions whenever they impaired federal constitutional rights. 
That application of the public-private distinction raised, in turn, a subsidiary 
question. What if the unconstitutional actions of state officials were prohibited by 
the laws of their own states? If such officials disobeyed state law and, in effect, 
betrayed their office, could they fairly and properly be seen as acting on behalf of 
the state? The Court also struggled with that question50 before finally resolving it 
by once again aptly retailoring the public-private distinction. This time it simply 
broadened the former category. Officials who took actions forbidden by the law of 
their states, the Court held in 1913, remained public actors subject to the 
Fourteenth Amendment ahd enjoinable by the federal courts. 51 
A final problem still remained, however, for Young's resolution of 
the Eleventh Amendment problem created a constitutional conundrum. 
If the Eleventh Amendment did not prevent the federal courts from issuing 
injunctions because state officials enforcing unconstitutional laws were 
"stripped" of their official status and became in law only private persons, how 
could the actions of such private persons violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which, after all, was limited by the state action requirement and could therefore 
reach only public officials? Again, the public-private distinction, suitably and 
this time rather ruthlessly readapted, enabled the Court to hack through the 
constitutional Gordian Knot. For Eleventh Amendment purposes, state officials 
would be considered private persons standing beyond the provision's reach and 
therefore subject to suit in federal court; for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, 
such officials would be considered public actors subject to all of the provision's 
commands and enjoinable for its violation. Thus, in a jurisprudential tour de 
force, the Court cast aside the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction and 
conferred on state officials a uniquely split constitutional personality, determin-
ing that they were, at the very same time and in regard to the very same actions, 
both public and private persons.52 
The Court's reasoning in those various cases made perfect sense as matters of 
policy and purpose. In its different guises the public-private distinction that ran 
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through the Court's Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment decisions served the 
same single purpose. In each formulation the distinction ensured that the federal 
courts would be able to protect the kinds of rights they regarded as fundamental 
and check state regulatory efforts they regarded as improper. All confirmed 
Morty's argument about both the pervasiveness and utility of the public-private 
distinction and the politico-institutional purpose that animated the new 
conservatives. 
THE NATURE OF "CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT" 
Drawing on these three themes, as well as others, Morty advanced a double 
argument about the general jurisprudence of the turn-of-the-century Court. He 
maintained, first, that the justices sought to establish a "real constitutional check 
on the legislature" and, second, that their efforts drove "the intellectual process by 
Which the categories of Classical Legal Thought became ever more essentialist."53 
On the first point he was surely right. The Court's decisions were clearly designed 
to provide effective checks on legislative action as well as categorical lines that 
Would seem readily and properly enforceable by the courts. 
On the second point, however, the "essentialist" nature of the Court's classi-
cal legal thought, some skepticism may be in order, depending, of course, on 
exactly how one interprets the concept "essentialist." The Court's repeated and 
deft adaptations of the public-private distinction in its Eleventh and Fourteenth 
Amendment decisions-and the consistent results it achieved thereby-suggested 
a Court that utilized "bright-line" reasoning pragmatically and creatively, not 
a Court in deep thrall to substantively "essentialist" categories and boundaries. Or, 
to put the point another way, insofar as the Court appeared to be essentialist, that 
appearance masked-in at least a good many areas-a quite self-conscious 
and policy-based instrumentalism. Indeed, in every area I have reviewed-
the jurisdiction of the lower courts, the rules of the federal common law, the 
institutional powers of the Supreme Court, and the general vision of the federal 
judiciary's proper constitutional role-the Court's jurisprudence was flexible, 
adaptive, purposeful, and policy driven.54 
If those examples are not convincing, consider one more-the Court's con-
struction of the fundamental constitutional concept of a state. Addressing the 
Eleventh Amendment, the Court held in Hans that "states" enjoyed a sovereign 
immunity that barred suits against them in the federal courts. Immediately, how-
ever, it began not to expand but to shrink the meaning of the term "state." On the 
very day it decided Hans, in fact, the Court held in Lincoln County v. Luning that 
counties did not come within the meaning of the term "state" in the Eleventh 
Amendment and-to spotlight its narrow definition of the term-announced 
unnecessarily that cities, towns, and other municipal corporations were also 
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excluded from its meaning. 55 The following year the Court affirmed the principle 
that the term "state" in the Eleventh Amendment did not necessarily include state 
officials56 and started down the road that led haltingly but directly to Ex parte 
Young and the critical holding that state officials were also excluded from the def-
inition of the "state," even if injunctions against them could absolutely prevent 
"states" from acting or enforcing their laws. Subsequently, the Court ruled that 
the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits against states in federal court brought 
by the United States government57 and that it did not prevent the United States 
Supreme Court from reviewing actions against states brought in state courts pur-
suant to state laws that authorized such suits but limited them solely to the states' 
own courts.58 The Court, in other words, constricted the Eleventh Amendment 
severely by defining the term "state" with exceptional narrowness, thereby barring 
from the federal courts only the tiniest fraction of cases that could be brought to 
prevent states and their local government units from implementing their chosen 
policies. 
In contrast, in construing the statute establishing its own mandatory appel-
late jurisdiction, the Court gave the term "state" an entirely different meaning. 
The federal judicial code provided a right of mandatory appeal to the Court from 
any final state court judgment that rejected a federal law challenge to "the valid-
ity of a statute of any state."59 The word "state," as well as the word "statute," 
seemed to give the provision a specific and easily understood meaning. In its deci-
sions, however, the Court stretched both terms far beyond their normal usage. 
"Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the 
force of law," it declared in 1877, "is a statute of the State within the [provision's] 
meaning."60 Subsequent decisions held expansively that the bylaws and ordinances 
of municipalities as well as the orders of state regulatory commissions fell within 
the provision's definition of "statutes" of a "state."61 A state "may legislate" in any 
number of different ways and "delegate legislative authority to subordinate agen-
cies, such as municipal councils and state commissions," the Court explained in 
1928. "But whether this power be exerted in one form or another, or by one agency 
or another, the enactments put forth, whether called constitutional provisions, 
law, ordinances or orders, are in essence legislative acts of the State." All-"no 
matter what their form or by what agency put forth"-came within the definition 
of a statute of a state.62 Thus, in determining when parties could take appeals as of 
right to challenge state court judgments that denied federal law claims, the Court 
strained the statutory terms and stretched the concept of a state to include within 
its definition the actions of all of a state's regulatory agencies and local govern-
ment units. It was a sweeping and nearly all-inclusive definition of the term "state" 
that far exceeded the scope of the narrow and sharply exclusive definition that the 
Court gave the same term in construing the Eleventh Amendment. 
Though the two definitions were near-polar opposites, they produced in their 
different contexts identical consequences-just as did the Court's various 
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formulations of the public-private distinction in its Eleventh and Fourteenth 
Amendment decisions. Each definition stretched the power of the federal judiciary 
over the actions of state and local governments. Indeed, the Court acknowledged 
that underlying purpose. In blunt words that fairly applied to its decisions in all 
those areas, the Court explained its expansive construction of the jurisdictional 
statute by declaring that the Constitution's "protections" applied to every "form in 
which the legislative power is exercised" and that the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts was "designed to be in aid of such protection."63 
Those radically inconsistent definitions of the concept of a state represented 
judicial instrumentalism in its baldest form. Thus, while it was surely true that 
the Court sought to create a "real constitutional check on the legislature"64 
and that it often relied on bright-line categories in doing so, it seems doubtful that 
the Court's "essentialist" language-at least in its decisions shaping the contours 
of the federal judicial power-either directed the justices' decision making or 
reflected their belief in substantively "real" legal categories and boundaries.65 It 
seems, rather, that such language was an accepted tool of judicial reasoning 
deployed to serve the public values and institutional arrangements that the 
Court's varying majority combinations thought fundamental and desirable.66 On 
the basis of the shrewd analyses in Transformation II, 67 moreover, I suspect 
that-in spite of a few seemingly contrary statements about the "essentialist" 
nature of classical legal thought68-Morty would, to some extent at least, agree 
With that conclusion. 
A HISTORIAN'S ACHIEVEMENT 
Although the themes I have discussed address major historical issues, they 
represent only a slight part of Morty's profound scholarly contributions. Indeed, I 
Would do a grave injustice to the overall body of his work if I did not at least 
tnention some of the other principal themes he explored: the close relation 
between law and politics, the struggle over distributional policies implicit in 
legal rules, the challenges of democratic constitutionalism under a "living" 
Constitution, and the compelling need for a "dynamic fundamentality" that 
operates "without Fundamentalism."69 These themes, too, resonate in the law and 
history of the federal courts, though exploring their salience and significance 
Would require a multi-volume study devoted to each. Thus, I do not here attempt 
specifics but only acknowledge both the relevance and importance of these addi-
tional Horwitzian themes for any effort to understand the law and history of the 
federal courts. 
I also mention this last group of themes for another and broader purpose, to 
acknowledge more generally the breadth and depth of Morty's work and, further, to 
suggest that in exploring these fundamental and controversial themes, Morty has 
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rendered the highest service that historians can offer. He has identified crucial 
issues, asked incisive questions, challenged established and comfortable assump-
tions, and illuminated central and enduring aspects of our national experience. For 
if law is not merely politics, it is nonetheless so intimately connected to politics that 
the two can be distinguished only with the greatest care and insight; and if American 
law has not been dominated by a continual effort to block legislative redistribution, 
it has nonetheless been profoundly shaped by many such efforts at many different 
times; and if the Constitution was written to establish certain timeless principles and 
permanent institutions, its meaning has nonetheless of necessity evolved as America 
and the world have changed; and if our most fundamental constitutional values 
must be honored and preserved, we can accomplish that only by understanding the 
significance of complex historical changes, adapting our laws and institutions to 
sustain those values in a living world, and rejecting the pieties, pretenses, and 
polemics of simplistic "originalisms" in all their forms. The preservation of those 
fundamental constitutional values requires, as Morty wrote in another context, a 
concerted effort to create and maintain a truly vibrant "democratic culture" in order 
"to make democracy a practical reality."70 
For affirming so powerfully that paramount American goal, as well as for his 
magnificent scholarly achievements, we honor him and we thank him. 
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